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Randy B. Birch, #4197 
Attorney for Appellant 
2964 West 4700 South, #210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84118 
Telephone (801) 967-6200 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
KENNETH BALL 
Defendant/Appellant, 
CASE NO. 920786-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant Ball contends that the Court has power to grant 
Appellant's petition for expungement of his criminal record. 
POINT I. APPELLANT/PETITIONER BALL'S RIGHTS TO AN EXPUNGEMENT 
VESTED WHEN HE COMPLETED ALL THE STATUTORY PREREQUISITES 
On April 15, 1992, Appellant/Petitioner Kenneth Ball had a 
legal right to petition the court for an expungement. This right 
was no different than a right to sue for negligence, breach of 
contract, or any other legal remedy. The actual filing of a 
petition is not part of the substantive remedy. It is simply the 
procedural mechanism of enforcing an existing substantive right to 
expungement. This right should not be retroactively taken away 
from Petitioner Ball, any more that the legislature could 
retroactively take away a right to sue for negligence or breach of 
contract. 
Petitioner Ball agrees with the State's position as set forth 
on page 7 of its brief that a party's rights vest when the party 
claiming the right is first entitled to institute a judicial 
proceeding for the enforcement of his rights. Payne v. Meyers, 743 
P.2d 186, 189 (Utah 1987), quoting Am.Jur.2d Actions §88 (1962). 
Applying that rule to this case, it is clear that Petitioner 
Kenneth Ball became entitled to an expungement of his criminal 
records as of April 15, 1992, the date the order was entered 
reducing his conviction to a third degree felony. 
The applicable portions of the statute that was in place on 
April 15, 1992, §77-18-2, the date Mr. Ball's conviction was 
reduced to a third degree felony, sets forth the requirements for 
an expungement as follows: 
(1) (a) A person convicted of any crime, except a capitol 
felony, first degree felony or second degree forcible felony 
as defined in subsection 76-2-403(3), within this state may 
petition the convicting court for an expungement and for 
sealing of his record in that court. The person shall file 
both the petition and a certificate issued by the Utah Bureau 
of Criminal Identification,....indicating that there is no 
record with the bureau of an expungement regarding the 
petitioner. ... 
(c) The Court shall enter an order to seal all records in the 
petitioner's case in the custody of the court or in the 
custody of any other court, agency, or official if the court 
finds: 
(i) the petitioner has not been convicted of a felony or 
of a misdemeanor for a period of seven years... 
(ii) that no proceeding involving a crime is pending or 
being instituted against the petitioner; and 
(iii) the petitioner has presented to the court a 
certificate issued by the bureau as described in 
Subsection (l)(a). 
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What are the substantive requirements of the statute? Upon a 
close review, the requirements that the petitioner must meet are: 
1) that he not be convicted of a capitol, 1st, or 2nd degree 
felony; 2) that he not have been convicted of a felony or 
misdemeanor for seven years; 3) that there not be a pending 
criminal proceeding; and 4) that he not have previously received an 
expungement. 
It is undisputed that Petitioner Kenneth Ball, as of April 15, 
1993, the date the order was entered reducing his conviction to a 
third degree felony, 1) had not been convicted of a capitol, first, 
or second degree felony; 2) since his conviction 12 years ago, Mr. 
Ball has not been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor; 2) there 
was no pending criminal proceeding against him; and 4) he had not 
previously received an expungement. THE PETITIONER BALL MET ALL 
THE SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH LAW! It was in complying with 
the procedural requirements of the statute that the problems that 
give rise to this appeal were encountered. 
The Court should not be mislead into believing, as the State 
argues, that the filing requirements are substantive and 
accordingly the Petitioner did not qualify for the expungement. 
Literally by its simplest definition, filing requirements are 
procedural. It is true that the Court, in order to grant the 
expungement must find all of the above requirements are met, but 
the court so finding is different from whether or not the 
requirements had been met. It is clear that the requirements had 
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been met, the problem in the case at bar is that the court has not 
yet made the necessary findings. 
POINT II TO DEPRIVE APPELLANT BALL OF AN EXPUNGEMENT IS A 
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF A STATUTE AND THE EQUIVALENT 
OF AN EX POST FACT LAW 
To deprive Petitioner Ball of a vested right based upon a 
change of the statute is the equivalent of an ex post facto law, 
which laws are prohibited by the United States Constitution, 
Article I §9[3], and the Utah Constitution, Article I, §18. 
While expungement is arguably a civil remedy or right, its 
impact upon Mr. Ball, is equivalent to that of a crime being 
committed. By failing to allow the Petitioner the right to an 
expungement, the State of Utah has condemned Kenneth Ball to a 
penalty that lasts a lifetime. The application of a new 
expungement statute to a person who has already qualified for an 
expungement under the old law, constitutes a retroactive 
application of a statute to deprive the Petitioner of his 
substantive rights and must not be allowed by this court. As has 
been stated by our legislature, "No part of these revised statutes 
is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." §68-3-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
The State argues that the petitioner's rights do not vest 
until the court actually makes the necessary findings. This is a 
red herring issue. The right to an expungement vested in the 
Petitioner on April 15, 1992; if the Petitioner were to commit a 
criminal offense, he may lose those rights, but that does not keep 
- 4 -
the right to an expungement from vesting in the Petitioner once he 
has complied with all substantive requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1992 amendment to §77-18-2 is not applicable to Appellant, 
to find otherwise would violate §68-3-3 and Utah's prohibition 
against retroactive application of substantive laws. Appellant had 
begun the expungement process and possesses the necessary 
Eligibility Certificate. Appellant does not fall into the category 
or purpose of the legislature, and the statute is unconstitutional 
due to internal ambiguities and inconsistencies. 
Appellant respectfully requests that the court grant his 
petition for expungement. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2J> day of September, 1993. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this l ^ day of September, 1993, I caused 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Kenneth Bronston, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State 
Capitol, SLC, UT 844114. 
40 reply.bal 
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ADDENDUM 
6 
FILED II! ?' ^p-r'' " F F i C E 
Randy B. B i r c h , #4197 '
 D>. ,Q 7 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK |-pR |c 3 G5 \\\ 3L 
Attorney for Defendant 
254 West 400 South, #200
 r, =; :VSfr 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 531-7000 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH BALL, 
Defendant. 
ORDER REDUCING JUDGMENT OF 
CONVICTION 
CASE NO. 3521 
HONORABLE DOUGLAS I. CORNABY 
The Motion of the Defendant to reduce judgment of conviction 
pursuant to §76-3-402, Utah Code Annotated, came on for hearing on 
April 7, 1992, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. The Defendant was present 
and represented by counsel, Randy B. Birch, the County Attorney's 
office was also present. 
Based upon the motion of the Defendant, no objection of the 
County Attorneysfs Office and for good cause appearing, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED, that the conviction of the Defendant be reduced to 
a 3rd Degree felony and be recorded as such. 
DATED this _/5~ daY o f ^aiuh, 1992. 
'HONORABLE? DOUGLAS I. C&RNABY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 77-18-2 
(n) Probation may not be revoked except 
upon a hearing in court and a finding that 
the conditions of probation have been vio 
lated 
(b) (1) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging 
with particularity facts asserted to consti 
tute violation of the conditions of probation 
the court that authorized probation shall de 
termine if the affidavit establishes probable 
cause to believe that revocation, modifica 
tion, or extension of probation is justified 
(n) If the court determines there is proba-
ble cause, it shall cause to be served on the 
defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy 
of the affidavit and an order to show cause 
why his probation should not be revoked, 
modified, or extended 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a 
time and place for the hearing and shall be 
served upon the defendant at least five days 
prior to the hearing 
(n) The defendant shall show good cause 
for a continuance 
(in) The order to show cause shall inform 
the defendant of a right to be represented by 
counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent 
(IV) The order shall also inform the defen 
dant of a right to present evidence 
(d) (1) At the hearing, the defendant shall ad-
mit or deny the allegations of the affidavit 
(u) If the defendant denies the allegations 
of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney 
shall present evidence on the allegations 
(in) The persons who have given adverse 
information on which the allegations are 
based shall be presented as witnesses subject 
to questioning by the defendant unless the 
court for good cause otherwise orders 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, ap-
pear and speak in his own behalf, and 
present evidence 
(e) (i) Afler the hearing the court shall make 
findings of fact 
(11) Upon a finding that the defendant vio 
lated the conditions of probation the court 
may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term 
commence anew 
(in) If probation is revoked, the defendant 
shall be sentenced or the sentence previously 
imposed shall be executed 
(11) Restitution imposed under this chapter is con 
sidered a debt for willful and malicious injury for pur 
poses of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy 
as provided in Title 11, Section 523, U S C A 1985 
(12) The court may order the defendant to commit 
himself to the custody of the Division of Mental 
Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a 
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after 
the supenntendent of the Utah State Hospital or his 
designee has certified to the court that 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can 
benefit from treatment at the state hospital, 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available 
for the defendant, and 
(c) that persons described in Subsection 
62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving priority for treat 
ment over the defendants described in this sub-
section 
(13) (a) The department shall make rules in ac 
cordance with Chapter 46a, Title 63, Utah Ad 
nunistrative Rulemaking Act regarding distlo 
sure of presentence diagnostic evaluation and in-
vestigation reports to maintain confidentiality of 
the report 
(b) Disclosure of a presentence investigation 
report, including any supplemental diagnostic 
evaluation report, is exempt from the provisions 
of Chapter 2 Title 63 Government Records Ac 
cess and Management Act 1991 
77 18 2 Expungement and sealing of records 
(1) (a) A person convicted of any crime, except a 
capital felony, first degree felony, or second de-
gree forcible felony as defined in Subsection 
76 2 402(3), within this state may petition the 
convicting court for an expungement and for 
sealing of his record in that court The person 
shall file both the petition and a certificate is-
sued by the Utah Bureau of Criminal Identifica-
tion, hereafter referred to as "bureau" in this sec-
tion, indicating that'there is no record with the 
bureau of an expungement regarding the peti 
tioner Both documents shall be served upon the 
prosecuting attorney The court shall then set a 
date for a hearing and notify the prosecuting at-
torney for the jurisdiction of the date set for hear-
ing Persons having relevant information about 
the petitioner may testify at the hearing The 
court in its discretion may request a written 
evaluation by the adult parole and probation sec-
tion of the Department of Corrections, except 
that a written evaluation is required for any con- J 
viction of a sexual offense under Title Yb '_j 
~~J$) A person who at the time o( petition for 
expungement has two or more convictions for any 
type of felony offense on his record, not arising 
out of a single criminal episode, or whose felony 
criminal record has been previously expunged is 
not eligible for expungement of any of those of 
fenses regardless of type or degree of offense 
(c) The court shall enter an order to seal all' 
records fh the petitioner's case in the custody of 
that court or in the custody of any other court, 
agency, or official if the court finds } 
(0 the petitioner haa not been convicted of 
a felony or of a misdemeanor for a period of 
seven years in the case of a felony, six years 
in the case of an alcohol-related traffic of-
fense under Title 41, five years in the case of 
a class A misdemeanor, or three years in the 
case of all other misdemeanors or an infrac 
tion under Title 76 after his release from in 
carceration, parole, or probation, whichever 
occurs last, 
(n) that no proceeding involving a crime is* 
pending or being instituted against the peti 
tioner, l ind 
(in) the petitioner has presented to the 
court a certificate issued by the bureau as 
descnbecT in Subsection (l)(a) 
(d) The court shall issue to the petitioner a cer-
tificate stating the court's finding that he has 
satisfied the statutory requirements for expunge 
ment 
(e) The court may not expunge a capital ft 1 
ony, first degree felony, or second degree foiut. 
felony conviction 
(2) (a) When a person has been arrested with or 
without a warrant, that individual, after one 
month if there have been no intervening arrests 
may petition the court in which the proceeding 
occurred, or, if there were no court proceedings 
A00004 
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any court in the jurisdiction where the arrest oc-
curred, for an order expunging and sealing any 
and all records of arrest and detention which 
may have been made, if any of the following oc-
curred: 
(i) he was released without the filing of 
formal charges; 
(ii) proceedings against him were dis-
missed, he was discharged without a convic-
tion and no charges were refiled against him 
within 30 days, or he was acquitted at trial; 
or 
(iii) the record of any proceedings against 
him has been sealed under Subsection (1). 
(b) If the court finds that the petitioner is eli-
gible for relief under this subsection, it shall is-
sue its order granting the expungement and seal-
ing. 
(c) This subsection applies to all arrests and 
any proceedings which occurred before, as well as 
those which may occur after, April 27, 1987. 
(d) The court shall enter an order to seal all 
records in the petitioner's case which are in the 
custody of that court, or any other court, or any 
state, county, or local entity, agency, or official. 
(e) The petitioner shall distribute the orders of 
expungement and sealing to all affected agencies 
and officials including the court, the arresting 
agency, booking agency, Department of Correc-
tions, and the bureau. The bureau shall forward 
a copy of the expungement order to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. The bureau shall pro-
vide a list of the agencies named in this subsec-
tion and clear written directions regarding the 
requirements of this section to the petitioner. 
(3) The person who has received expungement and 
sealing of an arrest or conviction may answer an in-
quiring employer as though the arrest or conviction 
did not occur. 
(4) The court may permit inspection of the sealed 
records only upon petition by the person who i6 the 
subject of those records and only to the persons 
named in the petition. 
(5) (a) The bureau shall keep, index, and main-
tain all expunged and sealed records of arrests 
and convictions. Any agency or its employee who 
receives an expungement order may not divulge 
any information in the sealed expunged records 
Employees of the bureau may not divulge any 
information contained in its index to any person 
or agency without a court order, except for certi-
fication of an applicant for peace officer status, or 
for use by the Board of Pardons. 
(b) For judicial sentencing, a court may order 
any records sealed under this section to be 
opened and admitted into evidence. The records 
are confidential and are available for inspection 
only by the court, parties, counsel for the parties, 
and any other person who is authorized by the 
court to inspect them. At the end of the action or 
proceeding, the court shall order the records 
sealed again. 
(6) A person who willfully violates any provision o( 
this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(7) (a) The clerk of the court where the arrest, 
conviction, and expungement occurred may 
charge a fee of $50 under Section 78-3-16.5 or 
78-4-24 for processing the expungement order 
(b) The bureau may charge a reasonable fee 
for processing the expungement order under Sec-
tion 63-38-3. litti 
77-18-3. Disposition of fines. 
Fines imposed by the district court shall be paid 
into the General Fund, except fines received in coun-
ties that are not within the state district court admin-
istrative system. Those fines shall be paid to the 
county treasurer. ie88 
77-18-4. Sentence — Term — Construction. 
Whenever a person is convicted of a crime and the 
judgment provides for a commitment to the state 
prison, the court shall not fix a definite term of im-
prisonment unless otherwise provided by law. The 
sentence and judgment of imprisonment shall be for 
an indeterminate term of not less than the minimum 
and not to exceed the maximum term provided by law 
for the particular crime. Except as otherwise ex-
pressly provided by law, every sentence, regardless of 
its form or terms, which purports to be for a shorter or 
different period of time, shall be construed to be a 
sentence for the term between the minimum and 
maximum periods of time provided by law and shall 
continue until the maximum period has been reached 
unless sooner terminated or commuted by authority 
of the Board of Pardons. i980 
77-18-5. Reports by courts and prosecuting at-
torneys to Board of Pardons. 
In cases where an indeterminate sentence is im-
posed, the judge and prosecuting attorney may, 
within 30 days, mail a statement to the Board of Par-
dons setting forth the term for which the prisoner 
ought to be imprisoned together with any information 
which might aid the board in passing on the applica-
tion for termination or commutation of the sentence 
or for parole or pardon. 1980 
77-18-5.5. Judgment of death — Defendant to 
select method — Time of selection. 
When a person is convicted of a capital offense and 
the judgment of death has been imposed, the defen-
dant is entitled to select, at the time of sentencing, 
either a firing squad or a lethal intravenous injection 
as the method of execution. If the defendant does not 
indicate a preference at that time to the court, the 
judgment of death shall be executed by lethal intra-
venous injection 1888 
77-18-6. Judgment to pay fine or restitution 
constitutes a lien. 
A judgment which orders the payment of a fine or 
payment of restitution to a victim pursuant to Section 
76-3-201 constitutes a lien when recorded in the judg-
ment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in 
a civil action 1983 
77-18-7. Costs imposed on defendant — Restric-
tions. 
Unless specifically authorized by statute, a defen-
dant shall not be required to pay court costs in a 
criminal case either as a part of a sentence or as a 
condition of probation or dismissal 1980 
77-18-8. Fine not paid — Commitment. 
Wh«T, .i defendant is sentenced to pay a fine in 
«i<i<:iin'.M i«» ,t ,.-.,• xit .-. ;.iison sentence and the judg-
ment is that ihe jaii or prison sentence be suspended 
upon payment of the fine, the service of the jail or 
prison sentence shall satisfy the judgment If a defen-
dant fails to pav the fine and thereafter the court 
finds ihat 0,e defendant failed to make a good faith 
efloit to pa\ th.' !in»-. the court may, after a hearing, 
order the e.\fi\jtion of the suspended jail or prison 
sentence 11 a defendant is sentenced to pay a fine 
897 STATUTES 68-3-12 
covery of a penalty or forfeiture incurred, shall be 
affected by the repeal, but the proceedings may be 
conformed to the provisions of these revised statutes 
as far as consistent. 1953 
68-2-10. "Heretofore" and "hereafter" defined. 
The terms "heretofore" and "hereafter," as used in 
these revised statutes, have relation to the time when 
the same take effect. 1953 
CHAPTER 3 
CONSTRUCTION 
Section 
68-3-1. Common law adopted. 
68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law 
liberally construed — Rules of equity 
prevail. 
68-3-3. Retroactive effect. 
68-3-4. Civil and criminal remedies not merged. 
68-3-5. Effect of repeal. 
68-3-6. Identical provisions deemed a continua-
tion, not new enactment. 
68-3-7. Time, how computed. 
68-3-8. When a day appointed is a holiday. 
68-3-9. Seal, how affixed. 
68-3-10. Joint authority is authority to majority. 
68-3-11. Rules of construction as . to words and 
phrases. 
68-3-12. Rules of construction. 
68-3-13. Printing boldface in numbered bills — 
Purpose — Effect — Power of Office of 
Legislative Research and General 
Counsel to change. 
68-3-1. Common law adopted. 
The common law of England so far as it is not re-
pugnant to, or in conflict with, the constitution or 
laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws 
of this state, and so far only as it is consistent with 
and adapted to the natural and physical conditions of 
this state and the necessities of the people hereof, is 
hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in all 
courts of this state. 1953 
68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law 
liberally construed — Rules of equity 
prevail. 
The rule of the common law that statutes in dero-
gation thereof are to be strictly construed has no ap-
plication to the statutes of this state. The statutes 
establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects 
to which they relate, and their provisions and all pro-
ceedings under them are to be liberally construed 
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to 
promote justice. Whenever there is any variance be-
tween the rules of equity and the rules of common 
law in reference to the same matter the rules of eq-
uity shall prevail. 1953 
68-3-3. Retroactive effect. 
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, un-
less expressly so declared. 1953 
68-3-4. Civil and criminal remedies not merged. 
When the violation of a right admits of both a civil 
and criminal remedy, the right to prosecute the one is 
not merged in the other. 1953 
68-3-5. Effect of repeal. 
The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute 
any action or proceeding commenced under or by vir-
tue of the statute repealed. 1953 
68-3-6. Identical provisions deemed a continua-
tion, not new enactment. 
The provisions of any statute, so far as they are the 
same as those of any prior statute, shall be construed 
as a continuation of such provisions, and not as a new 
enactment. 1953 
68-3-7. Time, how computed. 
The time in which any act provided by law is to be 
done is computed by excluding the first day and in-
cluding the last, unless the last is a holiday, and then 
it also is excluded. 1953 
68-3-8. When a day appointed is a holiday. 
Whenever any act of a secular nature, other than a 
work of necessity or mercy, is appointed by law or 
contract to be performed upon a particular day, which 
day falls upon a holiday, such act may be performed 
upon the next succeeding business day with the same 
effect as if it had been performed upon the day ap-
pointed. 1953 
68-3-9. Seal, how affixed. 
When the seal of a court or public officer is required 
by law to be affixed to any paper, the word "seal" 
includes an impression of such seal upon the paper 
alone, as well as upon wax or a wafer affixed thereto. 
In all other cases the word "seal" may include a scroll 
printed or written. 1953 
68-3-10. Joint authority is authority to majority. 
Words giving a joint authority to three or more 
public officers, or other persons, are to be construed 
as giving such authority to a majority of them, unless 
it is otherwise expressed in the act giving the author-
ity. 1953 
68-3-11. Rules of construction as to words and 
phrases. 
Words and phrases are to be construed according to 
the context and the approved usage of the language; 
but technical words and phrases, and such others as 
have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in 
law, or are defined by statute, are to be construed 
according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning 
or definition. 1953 
68-3-12. Rules of construction. 
(1) In the construction of these statutes, the follow-
ing general rules shall be observed, unless such con-
struction would be inconsistent with the manifest in-
tent of the Legislature or repugnant to the context of 
the statute: 
(a) The singular number includes the plural, 
and the plural the singular. 
(b) Words used in one gender comprehend the 
other. 
(c) Words used in the present tense include the 
future. 
(2) In the construction of these statutes, the follow-
ing definitions shall be observed, unless the defini-
tion would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of 
the Legislature, or repugnant to the context of the 
statute: 
(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means: 
(i) all actions by a board, commission, de-
partment, officer, or other administrative 
unit of the state that determine the legal 
r i f f h t * ? H l l t l A C r»ri\/il£krr£io ;»%>.~..» —ii-J~~ - -
